In 1996 the Pope John Center (now the National Catholic Bioethics Center) offered a workshop for bishops to examine Pope John Paul II's landmark encyclical Evangelium vitae (The Gospel of Life). This collection of essays represents the proceedings of that workshop for scholars and students.

A founder of modern analytic philosophy and one of the most important logicians of the twentieth century, Bertrand Russell has influenced generations of philosophers. The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell explores this influence in detail and responds to renewed interest in Russell's philosophical approach, presenting the best guide to research in Russell studies today. -/- Bringing new insights into Russell's relationship with his contemporaries, a team of experts explore his life-long battles with important philosophical issues. (...) They consider how he influenced thinkers and schools of thought, from Schröder, Frege and Meinong to Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, while also covering his impact on individual issues in epistemology, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. Importantly this companion discusses often overlooked topics. Focusing on Russell's later views, including his moral philosophy and his politics, reveals that Russell did make significant contributions to ethics - both theoretical and practical - in the course of his career. -/- Through a combination of enlightening historical background and sustained focus on Russell's impact on contemporary areas of philosophy, The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell demonstrates why Russell continues to influence philosophers of language, mathematics, epistemology and metaphysics. (shrink)

Dans la première méditation, Descartes a conclu, en regard des songes, « qu'il n'y a point d'indices concluants, ni de marques assez certaines par où l'on puisse distinguer nettement la veille d'avec la sommeil [...] » . À la fin de la sixième méditation, il a conclu qu'il y a de tels indices, mais qu'on a besoin de la garantie de Dieu pour savoir si ces indices sont réellement des indices de la veille. Cottingham a proposé une objection générale contre (...) tels indices de la veille: On peut rêver cet indice. Selon les raisonnements de Cottingham, il s'agit de l'existence de l'indice. Or, chez Leibniz et Descartes il ne s'agit pas de cela, mais il est question de savoir si l'indice est vraiment un indice de la veille. La prétention que l'indice puisse être présent en songe fait une pétition de principe. Notre examen des indices que Leibniz et Berkeley ont proposés révèle cette pétition. (shrink)

While Russell’s concerns in developing the theory of descriptions were primarily with his foundation of logic, he was aware of the epistemological uses of both the theory of denoting concepts and the 1905 theory of deWnite descriptions. At the end of “On Denoting” he suggests that the principle of acquaintance is a “result” of the new theory of denoting. In this paper I examine the relation between the theory of descriptions and the principle of acquaintance, and I reject two (...) suggestions, one that Russell’s view commits him to the position that quantiWers range only over objects of acquaintance, the other that the principle of acquaintance plays a crucial role in the Gray’s Elegy argument. Russell’s earlier theory of denoting concepts went hand in hand with the principle of acquaintance, as Russell made clear in his “Points about Denoting”. So the principle of acquaintance was neither a motivator for the new account nor a special consequence of it. The new account of “On Denoting”, while dispensing with denoting concepts, preserved the connection that the older de-. (shrink)

The axiom of reducibility plays an important role in the logic of Principia Mathematica, but has generally been condemned as an ad hoc non-logical axiom which was added simply because the ramified type theory without it would not yield all the required theorems. In this paper I examine the status of the axiom of reducibility. Whether the axiom can plausibly be included as a logical axiom will depend in no small part on the understanding of propositional functions. If we understand (...) propositional functions as constructions of the mind, it is clear that the axiom is clearly not a logical axiom and in fact makes an implausible claim. I look at two other ways of understanding propositional functions, a nominalist interpretation along the lines of Landini and a realist interpretation along the lines of Linsky and Mares. I argue that while on either of these interpretations it is not easy to see the axiom as a non-logical claim about the world, there are also appear to be difficulties in accepting it as a purely logical axiom. (shrink)

From 1683 to 1685 Arnauld engaged in a controversy with Malebranche over the nature of ideas. While the occasion for the dispute was a disagreement over grace, the focus was the account of ideas given in Malebranche’s Search After Truth. Arnauld published his Des vraies et des fausses idées in 1683, and this was followed by a response from Malebranche in 1684 and a response by Arnauld shortly afterward. In his criticism of Malebranche, Arnauld claimed to be reacting not just (...) for himself, but for Descartes as well, and so a look at the controversy and the reasons given for the conflicting claims will, I believe, help in understanding Descartes’ own difficult remarks on ideas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scientific Method in PhilosophyAuthor's note: Thanks to Gregory Landini for helpful clarifications.Gregory Landini. Repairing Bertrand Russell's 1913 Theory of Knowledge. (History of Analytic Philosophy.) London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Pp. x, 397. isbn: 978-3-030-66355-1, us$139 (hb); 978-3-030-66356-8, us$109 (ebook).The title of this book might suggest a rather narrow study of a problem with Russell's Theory of Knowledge and a proposed solution. But as with Landini's first book, (...) class='Hi'>Russell's Hidden Substitutional Theory, the title does not capture the full scope of the work. That work did not just point out the lingering substitution theory in Principia, but gave a sweeping view of Russell's overall development from Principles to Principia and one of the most detailed accounts of the formal system in Principia in any work. This work gives a sweeping overview of Russell's philosophy up to 1918, including not just Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgment, but the whole project of what Russell called scientific method in philosophy, which was the subtitle to his 1914 Our Knowledge of the ExternalWorld. Landini thinks this is the height of Russell's philosophy and proposes a fix to the problems which led Russell to abandon the project.Landini does not just present Russell's views during this period, but vigorously defends them, and not just the multiple-relation theory of judgment mostly associated with Theory of Knowledge, but also the views that logic should be understood as synthetic a priori, Russell's doctrine of acquaintance, including the acquaintance with universals as the grounding of synthetic a priori knowledge, and Russell's view that logic is the essence of philosophy. The book contains a wide range of discussions, including issues in philosophy of mind, theories of representation, theories of universals, evolution in philosophy, and the metaphysics of time and space.The book opens with an overview of some main themes, including Landini's view of the three main phases of Russell's post-idealist philosophy and his discussion of what he calls the revolutions in logic and mathematics. The three phases Landini has in mind are the Principles phase, the Principia phase [End Page 81] (which includes The Problems of Philosophy and Theory of Knowledge) and the neutral monist phase, which Landini sees as a mistake Russell made when he didn't see how to repair his 1913 work. According to Landini, the Principles era ends with the failure of the substitution theory from the po /ao paradox, the Principia era ends by 1918 with the abandonment of the attempt to finish the project of the 1913 Theory of Knowledge, and the neutral monist era begins in 1919 and continues through 1948. Landini wants to concentrate on repairing the view in the Principia era. Any remarks of Russell's from later rejecting, for example, his view of the subject, of acquaintance, of neutral monism, and remarks concerning logic as consisting of tautologies are to be rejected. Landini firmly believes that after abandoning the 1913 project, Russell took a wrong turn. Landini's discussion of the multiple-relation theory of judgment is therefore quite different from the other discussion in the literature, in that most commentators have thought Russell was correct in abandoning the theory and most think there is something to Wittgenstein's criticism. Landini thinks Wittgenstein's criticism was based on his new vision of logic, and that Russell should have rejected it and proceeded with the project of Theory of Knowledge.Given the controversies involved in these claims, I think the best way forward is an explication of Landini's new emphasis on the revolutions in logic and mathematics and some of the key claims Landini makes concerning the Principia era. Then we can look at the details of Landini's repairing of the project.the two revolutionsWhat is striking about Landini's more recent work is his emphasis on these two revolutions. One is the revolution within logic, which originates with Frege; the other a revolution in mathematics which originates with Weierstrass, von Staudt, Pieri and Cantor. While most historians of this period are aware of the important shifts... (shrink)

“La Poésie Comme Exercice Spirituel” first appeared in a 1942 issue of Revue Fontaine edited by Jacques and Raissa Maritain and was subsequently republished in Wah’s 1948 text Poésie, Pensée, Perception, published by Calmann-Lévy. The following is a translation of the Fontaine version. I have noted all of the variations from the latter version in the notes. As I emphasize in my commentary, the piece is a notable display of Wahl’s eclectic range of influences. Most importantly, it shows the (...) extent to which his interest in radical empiricism and process metaphysics informs his creative approach to the intersection of poetics and metaphysics. These interests are not explicitly named in the essay, and yet their influence is pervasive. The essay also includes several moments of substantial resonance with the work of Gilles Deleuze, as noted in the commentary. (shrink)

The year 2010 saw the centenary of the publication of the first volume of Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica. There were several conferences that year on this work and several collection...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:September 27, 2008 (1:09 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2801\russell 28,1 048RED.wpd russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 28 (summer 2008): 69–93 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631; online 1913-8032 eviews WITTGENSTEIN, CRITIC OF RUSSELL Russell Wahl English and Philosophy / Idaho State U Pocatello, id 83209, usa [email protected] Jérôme Sackur. Formes et faits: Analyse et théorie de la connaissance dans (...) l’atomisme logique. Paris: Vrin, 2005. Pp. 313. ¤31.00. isbn 978-2-7116-1722-7. Sackur joins several other recent French authors in writing penetrating analyses of Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s work. Forms and Factsz is an explication of the Tractatus, conducted by means of a contrast between Russell’s work and Wittgenstein’s. Sackur examines the interplay between Russell’s and Wittgenstein ’s versions of logical atomism, particularly, as Sackur puts it, between Russell’s original thought on the one hand, which provides the material for Wittgenstein’s position in the Tractatus, and Wittgenstein’s critique and development on the other, which, he says, provides a unity to Russell’s position (p. 12). While recognizing the inXuence of Russell on Wittgenstein’s project, Sackur in the end sees Wittgenstein as undermining and ultimately rejecting Russell’s logicism. He does not just repeat old claims about Wittgenstein, Russell and logical form. His analysis is very subtle and, perhaps unusually for a work on Wittgenstein which defends Wittgenstein over Russell, Formes et faitsz displays a surprisingly detailed knowledge of Russell’s work, before, during and after the period in question, 1913–19. Anyone who is interested in Russell’s and Wittgenstein ’s work during this period, and in particular Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Russell, will beneWt greatly from this book. There are detailed, well informed discussions of important points of disagreement, particularly Russell and Whitehead ’s account of succession and the ancestor relation, Wittgenstein’s remarks on operators, in particular the Nz operator, various remarks about the theory of types, and Wittgenstein’s now well known criticism of Russell’s theory of judgment. The subtitle of the work, “Analysis and the theory of knowledge in logical atomism”, reXects the points where Sackur sees the greatest disagreement between Russell and Wittgenstein. In the Wrst place, he sees them diTering in their attitude toward analysis, with Russell oTering translations of sentences into a September 27, 2008 (1:09 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2801\russell 28,1 048RED.wpd 70 Reviews 1 For the Wrst point, see (among others) P.yM.yS. Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth Century Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 69–70. For the second, see (again among others), David Pears, The False Prison (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1987), i: 63, where Pears says that Russell’s atomism was founded on the doctrine of “forced acquaintance”. 2 P.yJ. Hager, Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell’s Philosophy (Dordrecht: Klewer, 1994). perspicuous language and Wittgenstein oTering explications, or elucidations, of senses already in the sentences. Secondly, they diTer on the role that epistemology should play in logical atomism, with Wittgenstein criticizing the role of acquaintance in the development of logic. While both of these points have been made before,1 Sackur’s discussion is more thorough than previous studies and leads to some new interpretations of passages in the Tractatus. Sackur’s discussion of analysis is important to his argument. He is interested in a tension between what he sees as two aims of analysis in Wittgenstein’s work, one found in Tractatusz 3.2–3.3 and the other in Tractatusz 4.21–4.2211. He sees analysis in the Wrst group as revealing or elucidating the sense a proposition expresses, a sense understood and already there in the ordinary unanalyzed proposition, and analysis in the second group, driven by the theses of necessity and logical independence, as focusing on truth-functional analysis in terms of elementary propositions that consist of names referring to simple objects. He argues that these two aims don’t automatically go together and in fact appear to be at cross purposes. In the course of the Wrst chapter, the major distinction Sackur makes is between analysis... (shrink)

We wish to defend Jonathan Westphal's view that colour is complex against a recent ‘phenomenological’ criticism of Eric Rubenstein. There is often thought to be a conflict between two kinds of determinants of colour, physical and phenomenal. On the one hand there are the complex physical facts about colour, such as the determination of a surface colour by an absorption spectrum. There is also, however, the fact that the apparently simple phenomenological quality of what is seen is a function of (...) the physiological and psychological state of the viewing subject. Should the physical trump the phenomenal, or is it the other way round? Much of the phenomenal variation of colour, however, is explained by physical facts. There is a physics and a psychophysics of colour. Colours appear, to the colour scientists at least, to be in some sense objective, a sense not explained by the view that they are purely phenomenal. Taking physics and psychophysics into account will mean rejecting the claim that the content of what our concepts of colours are concepts of is exhausted by the purely phenomenal, or that we can determine these concepts simply by gazing at a colour. Taking account of physics will lead, as Westphal argued, instead to a view about white and the other colour terms like Putnam's account of gold. Necessary truths about colours cannot be explained without reference to the logic of the compossibility of what is given in reflection and absorption spectra, the analogue of H2O. (shrink)

Malebranche held that God acts only by general volitions and so is not constantly interfering in the world. The content of God's volitions appears to include the general laws of nature and the particular initial configuration of the created world, so that occasional or natural causes have an important explanatory role. It is clear that at the least Malebranche meant by a 'general volition' the willing of events which followed general laws. Steven Nadler argued that this is all we should (...) understand by a 'general volition', and so we should think that general volitions are simply particular volitions which follow a general law. I argue that this view is not the correct interpretation of Malebranche's general volitions, for it does not do justice to the theological doctrine of the Treatise, masks the genuine difference between Arnauld and Malebranche, and conflicts with what Malebranche says about practical volitions. I then argue that despite Malebranche's view of general volitions, there is still an important difference between his view and Leibniz's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviews 171 c:\users\ken\documents\type3402\rj 3402 050 red.docx 2015-02-04 9:19 PM REFLECTIONS FROM PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA Russell Wahl English and Philosophy / Idaho State U. Pocatello, id 83209 usa [email protected] Alexandre Guay, ed. Autour des Principia Mathematica de Russell et Whitehead. (Collection Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences.) Dijon: Editions Universitaires de Dijon, 2012. Pp. 168. isbn 978-2-36441-001-4. €20.00 (pb). his collection, by several distinguished French philosophers, is intended to (...) be a work on problems which are suggested by or perhaps stem from Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica. It turns out to be a somewhat eclectic collection. Some of the papers explicate points in Principia, some delve into issues from Principia or perhaps suggested by something in it, and q= 172 Reviews c:\users\ken\documents\type3402\rj 3402 050 red.docx 2015-02-04 9:19 PM some into issues suggested by later works of Russell’s. The collection was put together for the centenary of Principia, with the idea of focusing on “its posterity, the doors it has opened, the questions it has brought up, and the techniques it has initiated” (p. 5). The essays are all interesting, but in some of them the main focuses are only introduced and are not developed very much, appearing to explicate points already made in detail elsewhere and not adding a great deal that is new. The first essay, for example, gives an overview of the development of Russell’s logic, the theory of classes and the account of relations, the antinomies, the theory of descriptions and even the ramified theory of types. While the review is useful, there doesn’t seem to be here anything more than what would be found in the previous works of Denis Vernant, Jules Vuillemin, or Philippe de Rouilhan, on which the author draws. Hints of further issues are to be found in the discussion, but they are not developed because of the sheer number of points being reviewed. Denis Vernant, in the fifth essay, gives a thorough review of Russell’s account of similarity of relations and his use of this in relation-arithmetic, mostly from Chapter 6 of Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. Vernant points out that Russell uses the terms “analogy” and “exactly analogous” in several places and thinks of these in terms of his definition of structure. At the end of the essay Vernant begins with Russell’s formal account of structure and seeks to give an account of analogy, and specifically metaphor, using the tools of similarity of structure. Again, the discussion of similarity relations is good, but does not really go beyond previous work, and the application to metaphor, while interesting, is very brief. The sixth essay, by Nadine Gessler and Denis Miéville, discusses Lesniewski ”s criticisms of Principia and gives some hint of Lesniewski’s own positions. Lesniewski’s work is very interesting and has probably not been given its due. These authors briefly mention Lesniewski’s concerns about classes, the assertion sign and definitions, and then give a short presentation of Lesniewski’s own views. This last part is again just sketched out. The authors do point out difficulties Lesniewski had with parts of Principia, including the sloppiness about use and mention, the requirement that definitions be non-creative and the theory of types. They also point out that Lesniewski had a view of logic (reminiscent of Arnauld and Nicod) as “the art of thinking”, and they discuss his suspicion of sets as abstract entities rather than mereological wholes of the kind which can be grounded in experience. Lesniewski apparently thought of mathematical logic as limiting and not encompassing the whole of thinking. This is curious, because often Russell and Whitehead are accused of expanding logic in order to capture all mathematics as part of logic. Gessler and Miéville accent the differences between Lesniewski ’s position and Principia, but in many ways Lesniewski’s views are actually Reviews 173 c:\users\ken\documents\type3402\rj 3402 050 red.docx 2015-02-04 9:19 PM closer to those of Whitehead and Russell than to, e.g., the views... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 33 (summer 2013): 59–94 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036–01631; online 1913–8032 oeviews PRINCIPIA’S SECOND EDITION Russell Wahl English and Philosophy / Idaho State U. Pocatello, id 83209, usa [email protected] Bernard Linsky. The Evolution of Principia Mathematica: Bertrand Russell’s Manuscripts and Notes for the Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 2011. Pp. (...) vii, 407; 2 plates. isbn: 978-1-10700-327-9. £96; us$159. ussell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica was a pioneering work which was in many ways overtaken by the success of the new discipline it helped found. There is little doubt that Principia Mathematica was one of the most important works in the development of symbolic logic, as even Quine, one of the critics of the foundations proposed in it, said: “This is the book that has meant the most to me.”Yet few mathematicians or logicians follow the theory of types proposed in Principia as the foundation of mathematics, nor the logicist project of which it is a variant. While much of Principia ’s notation has been incorporated into modern formal logic and set theory, much of it also is dated and not easy for contemporary mathematicians and logicians to read. Among those who were dissatisfied with the philosophical foundations of the first edition were the authors themselves.1 During 1923 and 1924 Russell revised and updated Principia, and the second edition of the first volume appeared in 1925 with the other two volumes appearing in 1927. What resulted was a new edition with the philosophical underpinning modi- fied, but with the superstructure, that is, the resulting theorems of the three volumes, unchanged. Russell wrote a new Introduction and added three Appendices, but other than that made only minor changes.The new philosophy of logic had as its core idea a principle of extensionality which Russell expressed as the view that “functions of propositions are always truth-functions and a function can only occur in a proposition through its values” (PM2 1: ______ 1 Russell wrote the new material for the second edition, but it is clear from a letter to him byWhitehead on 24 May 1923, quoted by Linsky, that he, too, thought the foundational system needed tweaking: “I don’t think that ‘types’ are quite right” (p. 16). o= 60 Reviews xiv). It is interesting that at times Russell seems to have been hesitant about even endorsing this change.2 The second edition of Principia has not been well received; by and large it has either been ignored or scorned. Linsky cites especially negative remarks by Monk, but others have dismissed the second edition additions and it has generally been thought a failure since 1944, when Gödel pointed out an error in the Appendix B proof that mathematical induction can be “rectified” even without the axiom of reducibility. The Evolution of Principia Mathematica makes available to scholars Russell’s notes and manuscripts of the new material added to the second edition. Linsky also seeks to redress the indifference to the second edition, to set the record straight about several misunderstandings, and to give an account of the new material.The book he has produced will be very valuable to scholars of Russell and to anyone interested in the development of type theory and indeed of logic as a whole during this time. This is also a difficult book, both because the material can get quite technical at times and also because the new material included in the introduction to the second edition is somewhat sketchy, and there are philosophical and technical points about which Russell himself is less than clear. As a result there have been disagreements about how the second edition is best to be interpreted. Linsky recognizes that the interpretive issues are under-determined by the text and wants to stay relatively neutral with respect to the different alternatives about the various controversies. At times it can be difficult to keep the various positions straight.The difficulty lies with the material, and Linsky does a very good job of explaining the issues to the layman. The work is divided into... (shrink)

We investigated how people design interventions to affect the outcomes of causal systems. We propose that the abstract structural properties of a causal system, in addition to people's content and mechanism knowledge, influence decisions about how to intervene. In Experiment 1, participants preferred to intervene at specific locations in a causal chain regardless of which content variables occupied those positions. In Experiment 2, participants were more likely to intervene on root causes versus immediate causes when they were presented with a (...) long-term goal versus a short-term goal. These results show that the structural properties of a causal system can guide the design of interventions. (shrink)

This commentary considers Wahl’s 1942 “Poetry as Spiritual Exercise” in the context of his interests in radical empiricism and process metaphysics. In doing so, it raises appreciation for the complexity of his thought, identifies specific notes of influence on Gilles Deleuze, and responds to worries that Wahl’s notion of spiritual exercise is predominantly a form of withdrawal, quietism, or retreat from the horrors of World War Two. For Wahl, rather than passive contemplation of a determinate artifact, poetry (...) is a mode of experience that, to speak with Whitehead and James, is a making. This experience of poetry develops affordances of thought that strengthen existential capacity for remaining open to uncertainty, fragility, and vulnerability. (shrink)

BackgroundThere is a growing interest in using cognitive–behavioural therapy (CBT) with people who have Asperger syndrome and comorbid mental health problems.AimsTo examine whether modified group CBT for clinically significant anxiety in an Asperger syndrome population is feasible and likely to be efficacious.MethodUsing a randomised assessor-blind trial, 52 individuals with Asperger syndrome were randomised into a treatment arm or a waiting-list control arm. After 24 weeks, those in the waiting-list control arm received treatment, while those initially randomised to treatment were followed (...) up for 24 weeks.ResultsThe conversion rate for this trial was high (1.6:1), while attrition was 13%. After 24 weeks, there was no significant difference between those randomised to the treatment arm compared with those randomised to the waiting-list control arm on the primary outcome measure, the Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety.ConclusionsTrials of psychological therapies with this population are feasible. Larger definitive trials are now needed. (shrink)

Russell Goodman tells the story of the development of philosophy in America from the mid-18th century to the late 19th century. The key figures in this story, Jonathan Edwards, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, the writers of The Federalist, and the romantics Emerson and Thoreau, were not professors but men of the world, whose deep formative influence on American thought brought philosophy together with religion, politics, and literature.